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INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
By FOREST A. HARNESS*

The United States has set up orderly machinery for the
extradition of fugitives from most of the countries of the
world. All of our extradition treaties provide for the same
general procedure. The principal variance being in the specified crimes and offenses for which extradition may be granted.
This variance is due in the main to the difference in the criminal laws of foreign countries, some of which do not recognize as crimes or offenses, acts that are denounced as criminal
by other countries. Under our extradition treaties, fugitives
can only be surrendered for acts which are made crimes or
offenses by the laws of both countries, and then only upon competent legal evidence, according to the laws of the country
where the fugitive is found, which would justify his apprehension and commitment for trial if the acts had been committed
there,
This does not mean, however, that the crime or offense must
have the same name in both countries, but it is sufficient if
the acts are criminal in both countries and are within the
terms of the treaty under which the proceedings are brought.
Some of our extradition treaties have been in existence for
many years and need to be revised and modified to include
offenses that were not denounced by the criminal law at the
time the convention was negotiated. The United States has
sought in recent years to modernize these older treaties. Our
government is also negotiating new extradition treaties with
countries with which we have not heretofore had agreements
for the surrender of fugitives from justice.
The provision in our extradition treaties, as well as a similar
provision in the extradition treaties of other Anglo Saxon
0 Of the

Indianapolis Bar, formerly Special Deputy Attorney General.

INDIAN.4

LAW

JOURNAlL

countries, requiring as a prerequisite to extradition legal proof
of probable cause, or sufficient competent evidence to justify
the apprehension and commitment for trial of the accused,
has caused no little confusion in the minds of courts in the
Latin and Balkan countries, who have found it difficult under
the laws of their countries, to distinguish between proof of
probable cause and proof of guilt.
This question was the determining factor with the Justices
of the Supreme Court of Athens, in the extradition case of
Samuel Insull. It was urged by the representative of the
United States in that case, that the scope of the inquiry by
the Greek court under Article I of the treaty, was limited to a
finding, solely from the evidence submitted by the United
States, as to whether or not the accused should be committed
for trial, and that the court would invade the province of the
trial court and jury if it examined the substance or merits of
the case to determine guilt.
Article I of the Extradition Treaty between the United
States and Greece provides
"It is agreed that the Government of the United States and the Government of Greece shall, upon requisition duly made as herein provided,
deliver up to justice any person, who may be charged with, or may
have been convicted of, any of the crmes or offenses- specified in Article
II of the Present Treaty committed within the jurisdiction of one of

the High Contracting Parties, and who shall seek any asylum or shall
be found within the territories of the other, provided that such surrender shall take place only upon such evidence of criminality, as according to the laws of the place where the fugutive or persons so
charged shall be found would justify his apprehension and commitment
for trial if the crime or offense had been there committed."

It is perfectly clear to an American or English lawyer that
under this provision the court in an extradition hearing sits as
a committing Magistrate, and it is not the function of the
court to determine whether the accused is guilty, but merely
whether there is competent evidence which, according to the
law of the country, would justify the holding or commitment
of the accused for trial upon the indictment or accusatton, if
the acts had been committed in that country The United
States Supreme Court in Collins v. Loisel, 259 U 8. 309, in
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construing a similar provision in our extradition treaty with
Great Britian, held that the accused was entitled to testify
and give other evidence only to explain the evidence produced
against him, or otherwise to establish want of probable cause,
and was not permitted to give evidence to sustain a defense,
since otherwisc the country demanding the extradition would
be required to conduct the trial at the place of arrest, instead
of at the place where the offense was committed, as contemplated by the treaty
At the time Samuel Insull sought an asylum in Greece, the
United States Government did not have an ext adition treaty
with the Hellenic Republic, but was negotiating with that country for one. As soon as it was dz.finitely learned that the fugitive Insull had gone tc Greece, these negotiations for an extradition convention were speedily concluded and the treaty between the two countries was signed and i atified. Almost immediately after the treaty became effective the United States
Government, acta.g upon the application of the State of Illinois, requested the Greek Govc.-nment to arrest Mr. Insull
and hold him for extradition to the United States, to answer
an indictment of the Grand Jury of Cook County, Illinois,
charging the crime of cibezzlement, one of the extraditable
offenses enumerated in the treaty The fugitive was arrested
but after a hearing before the Supreme Court of Athens, was
discharged on the ground that the evidence was not sufficient
to justify his commitment for trial for the crime of embezzlement. This same evidence, however, was held sufficient by the
Canadian Courts for the extradition of Martin J Insull,
jointly indicted with his brother, Samuel Insull, in the Illinois
State Court and who was surrendered to the United States,
and finally tried in Cook County About a year later the
United States Government again requested the Greek Government to arrest Mr. Insull aid hold him for extradition to
answer an indictment of the Fedeial Grand Jury for the
Northerln District of Illinois charging a violation of tile National Bankruptcy Act, which offense was also specified in the
extradition treaty, and after an exhaustive hearing the Greek
Court again refused extradition-four Justices of the court
holding against extradition and the Chief Justice dissenting
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in a minority opinion. These opinions are interesting, and
plamly show that the finding of the court was the result of
a trial upon the merits of the case, rather than a hearing to
determine probable cause for the accusation.
The majority opinion presents an illogical and contradictory discussion of the facts and the law and is indeed an
amazing document. In substance the majority opinion states
Extradition does not aim at rectifying the affront done by the accused
to the law of the country demanding his extradition, and can not be
granted unless the act for which the accused has been indicted or sentenced, is punishable under the laws of both countries. The offenses
need not bear the same name, nor be included in the same category,
nor be punished by the same penalty, in the two sets of laws. The
extraditing country has the right to examine the -substance and basis
of the charges in order that additional safeguards may be created for
personal liberty. Under Article I of the treaty, extradition can not
be granted unless according to the laws of the extraditing country, there
is sufficient indication of guilt justifying the arrest and commitment for
trial of the accused, if the offense had been committed in the extraditing
country itself.
It is undeniable, as set forth in the first count of the indictment
that the accused, together with others, knowing the insolvent condition
of the corporation, handed over out of the corporation's assets and
capital the sum of $558,120 for the payment-of a dividend on the corporation's preferred stock, which dividend was paid, not out of the
real earnings or surpluses of the company, but really out of its capital
the earnings and surpluses being fictitious and imaginary. These acts
constitute offenses under the Greek bankruptcy law as well as the
bankruptcy law of the United States, and the Greek bankruptcy law
punishes for fraudulent bankruptcy, the administrators of the company
who pay to shareholders dividends manifestly non-existent and thereby
reduce the share capital. The danger from the payment to the shareholders of non-existent dividends, by reducing the share capital, is
obvious and such acts are manifestly intended as" a snare for the attraction of outside capital to a precarious enterprise. The payment of dividends, manifestly non-existent, at the expense of the share capital, is
in itself fraudulent, and it is not necessary to prove any other more
specific definition of fraud. It is also undeniable that the accused,
together with his associates, did not hesitate to commit an act which
is forbidden both by the moral law and the criminal law of all countries.
The evidence clearly shows that he caused fraudulent and illegal sales
and purchases of the corporation's shares on the Chicago Stock Exchange,
in maintaining the company's share at fictitious and inflated values, and

INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION

through "this Satanic artifice" deceived the public. Such acts are
manifestly immoral and acts which no self-respecting person can commit, and these acts on the part of the accused are a violation of written and unwritten law, but were performed at a time when the postwar financial whirlwind in America was sweeping away everything,
and must not be judged with the same measure of severity as would
apply to normal conditions. These tactics are a very common practice
of corporations for maintaining the company's credit at all cost.
The accused, of advanced age, and suffering from a serious complaint,
was primarily an engineer of great enterprise, an assistant of the great
inventor, Edison, he contributed to the world's industrial progress by
achieving the production of cheaper electricity. His great electric empire was useful to mankind. And lastly, it must not be overlookod that
the petition in bankruptcy against the corporation was not filed for a
long time after the company became insolvent, and the prosecution of
the accused did not begin until he had left the United States with the
good wishes of a goodly number of his fellow citizens, which fact
shows that even in the United States the acts committed by the accused
were not at first considered fraudulent.
By all the foregoing considerations, the court is led to the
conclusion that at present there is not sufficient evidence to
justify the commitment for trial of the accused.
The minority opinion of the Chief Justice is a concise presentation of the law and the facts and states in part: "The
Council is unanimously of the opinion that the accused did
commit the offenses under the American law, for which he has
been indicted. * * * The Council is likewise agreed that the
accused and his co-adjutors did, in the management of the

company's affairs, commit acts which are forbidden both by
the moral law and by the laws in force everywhere, * * *
And these acts do not lose their immoral and unlawful character by the fact that such acts are not unusual, so that the
conduct of the accused should not be judged with the severity
required under normal conditions (a question, it is emphasized, that belongs to the competency of the court that will
try the substance of the case) "
It.will be seen from these opinions, that the court was satisfied the accused committed the acts charged and that the acts
were a violation of the bankruptcy laws of both countries, but
the finding that the acts should not be judged with the severity
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required under normal conditions was an invasion of the trial
court's prerogative.
The refusal of the Greek Government to extradite the
fugitive in the face of these findings, was clearly a violation
of the terms and provisions of the treaty between the two
nations, and the United States Government thereupon, acting
under Article VIII, denounced the treaty, stating in substance,
that the decree of the court was untenable and contrary to the
convention, that it was obvious the court attempted actually
to try the case upon its merits instead of confining itself
to ascertaining whether the evidence submitted by the United
States was sufficient to justify the fugitive's apprehension and
commitment for trial.
This was probably the first time in its history that the
United States denounced an extradition treaty with a foreign
nation, which action, in effect, terminated the treaty after the
expiration of the period therein provided-a determined and
aggressive stand fully justified under the circumstances.
Following the action of the United States in denouncing
the treaty, and undoubtedly due in a measure to the widespread criticism of the decision, the Greek Government notified the fugitive to leave Greece on or before a specified day,
on the ground that his presence in the Hellenic Republic was
embarrassing to the Government, and he was, therefore, an
undesirable alien.
Appeals from this order were taken to the Greek Cabinet
and the Council of State but failed, and the Government remained firm in its determination that Insull must go. However, before the final day fixed for his departure, Mr. Insull
secretly chartered the S S Maiotis, a Greek freighter, and in
March, 1934, set sail. He had obtained several extensions
of the order to depart on the plea that he was too ill to travel,
and his secret departure without complying with the usual
formalities and without the knowledge of the Greek officials,
so enraged the latter that they instituted a search for the
Maiotis, which was. located somewhere at sea, and forced to
return to Piarius, the port of Athens, where the vessel was
officially cleared and Mr. Insull formally checked out. After
a few weeks .ofsailing around in -the Mediterranean, the S S
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Maiotis, carrying the fugitive, put into the Bosphorus for
food, fuel and other supplies. While the steamship was at
anchor, in the harbor at Istanbul, the Turkish Police boarded
the vessel, seized and removed the fugitive therefrom, took
him to shore where he was incarcerated in the prison at
Istanbul. After a brief hearing before the Turkish Court
to determine his identity, the Turkish Police removed the
fugitive from Istanbul to Smyrna and there took him aboard
the S S ExIonia and delivered him to an agent of the United
States who took him into custody and delivered him to the
United States Marshal in the Northern District of Illinois,
the jurisdiction where the indictments were pending.
In addition to the bankruptcy charge upon which the Government sought to extradite Mr. Insull from Greece, he and
others were under indictment in the Federal Court at Chicago
for the use of the United States mail in furtherance of a
scheme and artifice to defraud in the sale of the shares of one
of the Insull corporations. Had the Government been successful in extraditing Mr. Insull from Greece, he could have
been tried only on the bankruptcy charge, but since the extradition proceeding in Greece failedi and since his surrender
was not pursuant to an extradition treaty with the Republic
of Turkey, Mr. Insull was arraigned on both the indictments
in the Federal Court, as well as the indictment in the State
Court charging embezzlement.
Prior to his arraignment, Mr. Insull attacked the jurisdiction of the court, alleging that his removal from the Greek
vessel by the Turkish Police, his delivery into the hands of
the United States representative and his subsequent return
to the United States, was illegal and in violation of his rights
under the "laws of the United States and under international
law -It was urged that since the Greek Court had refused
his extradition under the treaty, his seizure while on Greek
('territory" was a violation of the extradition treaty between
Greece and the United States.
The Government successfully contended that there was no
treaty involved in the case, that the United States had no
extradition treaty with the Republic of Turkey and that the
extradition treaty between the United States and Greece was
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not called into operation, that Mr. Insull was not, m fact,
extradited under any treaty, but was delivered over to the
United States authorities by Turkey as a gesture of good will
and in a spirit of friendly cooperation for the enforcement of
law; and that when a person is accused of crime and has departed the jurisdiction of the court in which the indictment
was returned, and is subsequently found within the territorial
jurisdiction wherein he is so charged, the right to compel him
to answer to the indictment and to stand trial, is not unpaired
by the fact that he was brought from another jurisdiction by
illegal and otherwise questionable means, such as kidnapping
or unlawful force or fraud.
One of the leading cases in the United States in this ,connection is Kerr v. Illinois, 119 U 8. 436. In that case the
defendant was indicted in Illinois for embezzlement and larceny He fled from the United States and went to Peru.
Proceedings for his extradition were instituted under the
treaty between the United States and Peru and application
was made by our Government -for his surrender, a warrant
issued by the President directed one Julian, as a messenger,
to receive him from the authorities of Peru upon his surrender, and to bring him to the United States for trial. The
presidential agent, without presenting- the necessary papers
to the Peruvian officials or without making any demand upon
them for the surrender of Kerr, forcibly arrested him and
eventually caused him to be taken a prisoner to the State of
California. Before his arrival in that state, the Governor of
Illinois made a requisition -upon the Governor of California
for his delivery as a fugitive from justice. Upon his return
to Illinois, where the process of the Criminal Court was
served upon hun, he was held to answer the indictment. He
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, contending his
arrest and deportation was a violation of the treaty and that
his subsequent detention was unlawful. The Circuit Court of
Cook County remanded him to jail and held that whatever
illegality might have attended his arrest, it could not affect
the jurisdiction of the court or release him from liability to
the state whose laws he violated. He subsequently applied
to the Circuit Court of the United.States for a writ of habeas
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corpus, which was likewise denied, the court holding that it
was not competent to look into the circumstances under which
the capture and transfer of the prisoner from Peru to the
United States was made, nor to free him from the consequences of the lawful process served upon him. On appeal
to the Supreme Court of the United States that court affirmed
the judgment of the Circuit Court stating"It is contended * * * that the proceedings in the arrest in
Peru, and the extradition and delivery to the authorities of Cook
County, were not 'due process of law,' * * * He may be arrested
for a very heinous offence by persons without a warrant, or without
any previous complaint, and brought before a proper officer, and this
may be in some sense said to be 'without due process of law.' But it
would hardly be claimed that, after the case had been investigated and
the defendant held by the proper authorities to answer for the crime,
he could plead that he was first arrested 'without due process of law.'
So here, when found within the jurisdiction of the State of Illinois
and liable to answer for a crime against the laws of that State, unless
there was some positive provision of the Constitution or of the laws of
this country violated in bringing him into court, it is not easy to see'
how he can say that he is there 'without due process of law,' within
the meaning of the constitutional provision."
The court further states in its opinion that the treaty with
Peru was not called into operation, "was not relied upon,

was not made the pretext of arrest, and the facts show that
it was a clear case of kidnapping within the dominions of
Peru, without any pretense of authority under the treaty or
from the Government of the United States."
The court further stated.
"The question of how far this forcible seizure in another country,
and transfer by violence, force, or fraud, to this country, could be
made available to resist trial in the State court, for the offence now
charged upon him, is one which we do not feel called upon to decide,
for in that transaction we do not see that the Constitution, or laws, or
treaties, of the United States guarantee him any protection. There
are authorities of the highest respectability which held that such forcible
abduction is no sufficient reason why the party should not answer when
brought within the jurisdiction of the court which has the right to
try him for such an offence, and presents nio valid objection to his trial
in such court."
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Another interesting case squarely in point with the facts

is-U S. v. Unverzagt, 299 Fed. 1015 (Certiorari denied 269
U S. 566), where the court said
"By his petition the petitioner alleges in substance that he is unlawfully restrained of his liberty, in that the basis of his commitment is
an indictment returned in the Western District of New York, proceedings having been instituted to remove him from this District to
the District of New York; that he did not commit the crime charged
in the indictment, that of using the mails to defraud, and that he 'by
artifice and physical violence was abducted and kidnapped from the City
of Vancouver, province of British Columbia, Dominion of Canada, by
certain purported officials of the United States of America,' he being m
Vancouver on business with relation to a mine of which he is manager
in British Columbia, that he is a citizen of the United States, and that
his detention is unlawful, and prays that he be produced in court, and,
after hearing, discharged.
"It is contended by the defendant that, being in British Columbia,
a British Province, he could not be removed without the permission
of the British Columbia authorities; that, having been abducted, he is
unlawfully before the court, and this. court has no jurisdiction. The
offense of which the defendant is charged does not appear to be within
the extradition convention between the United States and Great Britain
(26 Stat. P 1508). Article I enumerates the causes applicable, and a
mail fraud case is not one of them. No asylum is guaranteed to defendant in Canada, and if a Treaty did cover the offense charged it would
be political, and not judicial, and. before the matter could be presented
to the court the Congress must make it a rule for the court. The
treaty between the United States and Great Britain is a compact depending upon honor between the Governments. Any infractions are
subject to international negotiations, so far as the party chooses to
seek redress. It must be obvious that with this the courts have nothing
to do. U. S. v. Rauscher, 119 U. S. 407, at page 418."1

The Federal District Court at Chicago overruled Mr. Insull's plea to the jurisdiction and held that he must stand trial
on the indictments pending against him. The court held that
the right of the Hellenic Republic or Turkey to give asylum
to the defendant is different from the right of the defendant
1 Other cases supporting this theory are, Ford v. U. S., 273 U. S. 593, Kelley

v. Griffin, 241 U. S. 6, Voight v. Tombs, 67 Fed. (2d) 744, Whitney V. Zerbst,
62 Fed. (2d) 970. This same reasoning has been advanced by English and
Canadian Courts as appears in Ex parte Scott, 9 B. & C. 446, 109 Eng. Reprint
166, and Rex v. Walton, 6 Ont. Week. Rep- 905.
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to demand security in such asylum. The Hellenic Republic
or Turkey, through their sovereignties, if unlawfully invaded,
may demand reparation and a surrender of the abducted
party, and also the parties committing the offense, and in case
of refusal to comply with the demand might resort to reprisals, or take any other measures it deemed necessary as
redress for the past, and security for the future. But that
question was purely political and could be settled only by
negotiation through diplomatic channels between the two
sovereign powers.
On the other hand where extradition treaties have been
brought into operation in the surrender of fugitives, the courts
of the United States have consistently upheld the treaty provisions, as "the law of the land," by limiting prosecution or
imprisonment of the surrendered person to the offense or
crime for which he was surrendered. The case of Johnson v.
Browne, 205 U 8. 309, is a leading authority on this question. In that case the petitioner was indicted in the Federal
Courts of New York for two separate and distinct offenses..
He was tried and convicted on one offense and pending an
appeal he fled to Canada and there sought an asylum. Request for his extradition was made by this country on the
Canadation authorities. After a hearing, the Canadian Court
denied the request and refused extradition on the ground
that the offense was not within the extradition treaty between
this country and Great Britain. A second request for the
extradition of the fugitive was made by this country on the
other offense pending in the Federal Court in New York.
After a hearing on this second request, the Canadian Court
ordered the extradition of the fugitive. He was thereupon
returned to the jurisdiction of the court where he was under
indictment, but instead of prosecuting him on the offense for
which he was extradited, under and pursuant to the treaty,
he was committed to Sing Sing Prison to serve the sentence
imposed upon him in the other case for. which the Canadian
Government had refused his extradition. The court held that
his imprisonment was unlawful and in violation of the treaty
between the two governments, that the United States Government was limited to the prosecution for the charge upon which
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he was extradited, that a treaty of this nature should be construed in accordance with the highest good faith.
An extradition treaty i's not a legislative act but a contract
between two nations and if its terms and provisions are invoked in the surrender of a fugitive from justice, the courts
are bound to comply with the treaty provisions in the trial of
the accused. However, if the treaty has- not been brought
into operation, it affords no protection to a person accused
of crime and removed from a foreign country by unlawful or
questionable means. The country from whose jurisdiction
the accused person was unlawfully removed may, under such
a situation, seek redress for the affront but only through
diplomatic channels.
Requistions for the surrender of fugitives from justice,
under our extradition treaties, are made by the respective
diplomatic agents of the contracting parties. The arrest of
the fugitive is brought about in accordance with the laws of
the country where the fugitive is found, and if after an examination of the evidence, it is decided that extradition is
due, the fugitive is surrendered in conformity to the law of
the extraditing country
If the fugitive has been convicted of the crime or offense
for which his surrender is asked, the duly authenticated judgment of the court showing the conviction is sufficient, provided
of course, that the conviction was for one of the crimes or
offenses specified in the treaty If, however, the fugitive is
merely charged with crime, a duly authenticated copy of the
warrant of arrest in the country where the crime was committed, and of the depositions upon which such warrant was
issued, must be produced, with such other proof or evidence
as may be deemed competent.
Where the surrender of a fugitive is sought from a country
with which our government has no extradition treaty, the removal of the fugitive is granted or refused according to the
laws of the country where the fugitive is found, and the cooperative attitude of its Government officials. In countries
where the United States has set up its extra-territorial courts,
fugitives found there and wanted in the United States for
offenses or crimes committed her6, are tried and removed by
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our own courts sitting there. Our courts in China, under
treaty regulations with that country, hear and are authorized
to remove fugitives from justice who have fled from the
United States and are found in China. Congress has had
under consideration, a bill to authorize the Consular officers
in Egypt to judge and remove fugitives found there and
wanted in this country for crimes or offenses committed here.
The power of Congress to delegate such authority to our
foreign diplomatic representatives is derived from treaties
with the respective countries.
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition
between the Government of the United States and any foreign
government, any Federal Court Justice, Judge or Commissioner or any Judge of a court of record of general jurisdiction of any state may hear the complaint charging any person,
found within its jurisdiction, with having committed within
the jurisdiction of any foreign government any of the crimes
provided for by the treaty or convention. If the court or
magistrate finds that the evidence is sufficient to justify the
apprehension and commitment for trial of the accused, if
the acts had been committed in that jurisdiction, the accused
is held and the finding of the court transmitted to the Secretary of State who orders the fugitive delivered over to the
representative of the foreign government demanding his
surrender.
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